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1. Problems in Modeling Navies . Why are navies difficult to
model? Are they more difficult to model than land forces? Are
there unique aspects of navies that require a different approach?
The disposition of navies is broad, covering large ocean areas,
they are very mobile, and they carry to a great extent, their own
capabilities, dependent upon their particular task organization.
Thus, they provide an operating force that is in many respects
unique to warfare. Detection and tracking play a crucial role in
naval warfare due to the expanse of the ocean, the techniques of
evading detection, the use and limits of weather, varying charac-
teristics of ocean basins and layers, sophisticated electronic
warfare (EW) techniques, and the use of space. In addition, the
crucial role of the exchange of information is important, to
include message communications, data links, and voice circuits.
Chance plays an important element in many aspects of naval
warfare, and efforts are constantly in progress to diminish the
element of chance so that rational choices can be made. It seems
reasonable, therefore, that in order to conduct more creditable
analysis, the use of deterministic models is more appropriate
than is the use of stochastic ones. Strike and hit problems
require a different approach in naval warfare due to the changing
ship dispositions, the makeup of a battle group, changing charac-
teristics of the sea and the weather. There are aircraft to be
reckoned with as well as long, medium, and short range missiles,
close in weapons systems, EW, etc.. Further complicating the
problem, naval units operate in the air, on the surface, and in
the water, each with its unique and differing physical mediums.
2. RSAS as a Solution . RAND Corporation has developed the RAND
Strategy Assessment System (RSAS), essentially as an aid to
performing net assessment, and modeling national security systems
from the level of the National Command Authority (NCA) to the
operating forces for both the U.S. /NATO and the USSR/Warsaw Pact
sides. The RSAS release as of the time of this analysis is 3.0,
and is the one that supports the discussion in this paper.
RAND has included two differing NCA models for both the Blue
and Red sides to play the political-military aspects at the
higher levels, and the equivalent of war plans on the military
levels to control the military units simulated. Various options
of the war plans are available, and user analysts can write their
own if desired, using the relatively easy to understand RAND-ABEL
programming language. In developing the RSAS, RAND has given
priority to the strategic and central European models, which are
the best developed at this stage. Some emphasis has been given to
the capability to handle other theaters such as the AFNORTH,
AFSOUTH, Southwest Asia, and Korean areas. More recently, RAND
has started to expand and improve the naval models. SSBN activity
and open ocean ASW were included as part of the earlier strategic
effort, and these aspects of naval warfare are being improved.
The capability to carry out attacks by and against surface battle
groups, SAG's, and with long range shore base strike aircraft, as
well as the beginnings of mine warfare, have all been recently
added to the system. Amphibious warfare can be played to a very
limited degree, but further refinement is required.
The RSAS is impressive. It is complex, but it runs on a
relatively simple Sun workstation using the UNIX operating
system. The directory structure is both broad and deep, but it
has a logical hierarchical organization. The RSAS has default
values for standard situations, and sample scenarios that can be
run with a minimum of effort. The system is complex, but the ease
in using it improves with each new release. As an analytic tool
it appears to have great promise. Almost any parameter can be
modified to meet analytic needs, if the best assessment output
value does not seem to be realistic. The RSAS objects when a
gross misassessment is made, such as "airlifting" battle groups,
requiring a certain amount of intellectual honesty on the part of
the analyst.
As noted above, RAND has recently increased its effort on
the naval models, and has cited the following primary issue areas
for detailed study: ASW, ASUW, AAW, Mine Warfare, and Amphibious
Warfare. With regard to improving naval engagements, RAND has
proposed the following areas: Naval Postures, Naval Tasks,
Engagements, Naval Strikes, the Naval Commander, and War Plans.
Some of the primary difficulties in the RSAS with regard to
modeling navies include command and control, and launching
attacks. Currently, there are difficulties in simulating the
naval command and control structure, especially for the Red side.
There are difficulties also in carrying out attacks from both the
Red and Blue sides. One cannot currently direct the carrier
battle group to carry out a standard attack against Red surface
groups without descending into the minutia of numbers and
weapons. Also, a coordinated Red attack is difficult to set up
and carry out against a Blue carrier battle group. Some units do
not have the proper weapons entered into the data base to conduct
attacks of which they are capable. Sensor systems are modeled,
but on a very rudimentary basis.
3. Red-side Simulation in Games . Certain key questions on naval
warfare have been posed with regard to Red-side war gaming and
simulation. While this paper cannot respond fully to these major
issues, the applicability of the RSAS to assist in evaluation can
be commented upon. With regard to the deployment of Red naval
forces in advance of the commencement of the land war battle, the
RSAS can be programmed to model runs for the case of predeploy-
ment of naval units, and to model runs involving naval deployment
simultaneous with the start of the land battle. Assessments can
then be made regarding the differing effect upon the overall war.
One difference that comes to mind would be the advance warning
accruing to the Blue side as a result of Red predeployment , with
the resulting advantage in readiness for Blue. With regard to the
initial use of tactical nuclear weapons at sea, this can be
played out by the RSAS with differing responses by both sides.
Once a series of control plans has been written, it is a matter
of an hour or two to run out the full global game, or theater if
desired, to gain insights into the problems and likely results.
There are multipliers in the RSAS which permit allowing for the
quality of readiness and training for units to the level played,
and for each side. While this aspect of the model is better
developed for the air/land battle, work is in progress to add it
to the naval models. Logistics and maintenance are admittedly not
thoroughly played in the RSAS. Further refinement is needed, but
the RSAS is a strategy system, and not every phase of warfare can
be played fully. For naval engagement interactions, the RSAS has
several models to simulate detection, attrition, and BDA, gener-
ally in an indexed and aggregated way. The outcomes can be
changed by modifying various parameters to reflect the judgment
of experienced naval officers and defense analysts. Details on
these models are included elsewhere in this paper. The RSAS
handles the Red concept of combined arms very well for the air/
land battle, to a lesser extent for the sea battle. Less clear,
as it is in the real world, is the issue of command and control
of warfare in the open ocean. RAND has proposed a "naval com-
mander" concept to deal with such issues as when battle groups
will engage, when long range air attacks will be made, and how
submarines will be controlled in the open ocean. Such models must
be as close to the real world as possible for best simulation,
and for proper student research and education. The Naval Post-





1. Soviet Naval Warfare . The emphasis in Soviet warfare is
certainly on combined arms warfare, and one of the primary
missions of the Soviet Navy is to support the advance of the
ground forces by the several means available to it. It is also
true that the Soviet Navy has missions that do not function
primarily in support of the ground forces. There is the strategic
nuclear mission, which is, of course, part of a combined arms
approach to nuclear warfare, but where do open ocean missions fit
in? Why are Soviet ships deployed to the Mediterranean, the
Indian Ocean, and the South China Sea. Why do submarines and
other ships foray out into the open ocean? If we think that the
Soviet Navy will fit neatly and solely into the mission of sup-
porting shore forces (aside from the strategic nuclear mission),
we are ignoring both the history of Soviet naval operations and
current fleet deployments. It certainly appears that there are
unigue aspects of Soviet naval warfare that reguire their own
separate modeling in gaming and simulation. (For additional
analysis on this point, see Captain Jim Amerault's study on the
problems involved in modeling US and Soviet naval asymmetries.)
2. The Northern Flank . This paper will not address the air-land
battle on the central front, this having been covered in great
detail many times over, by other author-analysts, but the naval
aspect of the flanks is important to both sides and should be
carefully considered. The case in the northern front is of great
interest because of the dangers in yielding control of this
important maritime related flank to Soviet control. If the
Soviets attain control of Norway, they would have relatively easy
access to the North Atlantic and vital NATO shipping lanes. Ocean
surveillance and ASW from Iceland would become hazardous and
control of the Norwegian Sea would be lost. If the Soviets march
through Finnmark down the difficult terrain of northern Norway,
or through the Finnish wedge, they can either use the sea flank
to their advantage, or face the possibility of being cut off by
NATO operations at sea. The RSAS models the northern and southern
flanks using a node network concept called the S-Land model that
is different than the more massive model of the central front.
(Part VI of the Tritten & Channell technical report on the RAND
Strategy Assessment System at the Naval Postgraduate School con-
tains an overview of the "Secondary Land and Other Theater
Models".) As noted in a recent RAND study by Pat Allen and Barry
Wilson, the "Secondary Land Theater Model" gives emphasis to key
discrete events and the details of road networks, and relegates
the modeling of continuous processes such as attrition in a
particular battle zone to a lower visibility level. The emphasis
is on the battle in military terms rather than sliding pistons
and Lanchester eguations. The S-Land model also depends heavily
on rules rather than algorithms alone for modeling various de-
cisions and adjudications, attempting to distinguish among dif-
ferent types of battles, and depending heavily on the RAND-ABEL
programming language. Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the Baltic
Islands (Bornholm and Zealand) are well modeled, Iceland is being
developed.
The actual movement of forces is along the LOC s where
adjudication is made with respect to the strength of the opposing
forces, the type of terrain, and the air situation. Coastal
control is also considered in the model. At the nodes, which are
important towns, airfields, harbors, etc., adjudication is made
dependent upon the opposing ground forces, the air situation, and
the issue of coastal control. Amphibious and/or airborne forces
can be inserted, with attrition exacted upon landing and, to a
certain extent, enroute. Data can be called up which indicates
the degree of control and forces remaining, to include some
information about the status of naval forces. Unfortunately,
there is no real naval warfare going on, other than what can be
described as strategic ASW. Carriers can be directed to the area,
and their aircraft can be sent to support the shore forces, but
there are no NATO amphibious ships, and the concept of an amphib-
ious landing force is difficult to implement. The war at sea
beyond the coastal zone, other than the theater support for the
Red side, has not yet been implemented. These deficiencies have
been recognized, however, and RAND has plans to overcome them in
the RSAS. Another problem for the analyst is that the S-Land
nodes and arcs are in numbers, not place names, making them
cumbersome to use and understand. Real names should be used
wherever possible, and command or area abbreviations should be
changed to those that are commonly used and understood throughout
NATO (e.g., NEUR should be AFNORTH)
.
The Red northern fleet is currently played as individual
units under the Northwestern TVD, which is awkward and should be
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reworked. The Northern Fleet with its surface, air and submarine
forces should have a war plan of its own, operating under the
appropriate TVD. Using the present RSAS structure, it is awkward
to look for the required naval air and naval infantry, while
attempting to sort these out from other air and the frontal
forces. In the real world, Soviet naval forces have their own
command and control structure; therefore, they should have their
own structures in gaming.
3. The Southern Flank . In the Mediterranean, the situation is
even more sea oriented, with the Soviet naval forces permanently
deployed on a year round basis, and presenting a constant threat
to the Sixth Fleet/Striking Force South. The S-Land model for
this area is not as well developed as it is for the North,
concentrating primarily on Turkey and Greece, although Italy and
Yugoslavia are under development. The RSAS naval war in the
Mediterranean currently more or less runs on its own, naval
engagements are scripted (by direction), or are ordered by a
control plan or through the RSAS "force window". If an analyst
wants a naval war in AFSOUTH that has a semblance of reality,
each side must be told what to do. The war at sea in the Mediter-
ranean requires much more work, and efforts must be made to
integrate it with the air/ land battle ashore. (RAND and the
National Defense University have recently completed a study on
AFSOUTH, but more effort is required regarding integrating the
land and sea wars.)
4. The Far East . The Far East is a diverse area with its great
expanses of ocean, complex naval commands, deployed fleets, and
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varied detection and locating capabilities. Here also, the ocean
areas modeled in the RSAS are too large, and are not placed
properly for naval warfare. Open ocean reconnaissance by Bear
aircraft cannot be accomplished, there are no amphibious units,
air wing attack is cumbersome, and it is difficult to move MPA
about. Basing is not permitted, e.g., in areas where MPA is
currently deployed in the real world (Diego Garcia). Realistic
naval war plans need to be written for both sides, and the naval
forces must be made capable of interfacing with the war ashore,
especially in complex situations such as will occur in the ocean
areas around Japan and Korea.
5. Naval Models in General . In conducting analysis and games with
the RSAS, a high level simulation, the analyst does not want to
be forced down into the "grass" and become lost in the details of
individual ships and weapons. Instead, broad concepts of task
force and fleet operations should be pursued. The RSAS has just
recently acguired the capability to conduct warfare at sea,
including Blue and Red attacks against opposing battle groups, as
well as limited mine warfare, and more realistic ASW scenarios.
However, carrier air wings are treated as a series of administra-
tive units ( individual squadrons ) , and not as an operationally
integrated group. The RSAS wants to know how many aircraft and
specific kinds of weapons for air wing strikes. This information
should be built into the RSAS using standard air wing tactics, so
that all that is needed is the order to attack, the target, and
the general level of the size or intensity of the strike.
With regard to detection and location problems, the RSAS
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models make some allowances for these problems in conducting
attacks against battle groups; however, the factors are rough,
and do not permit playing effectively one of the most important
aspects of naval warfare. Ground truth, or perfect intelligence,
is basically given to both sides. This makes a tremendous differ-
ence to the naval battle in which locational information is so
vitally important. Work is in progress, at least with the naval
models, regarding the availability of information on the opposing
forces. This is a complex problem that needs more work - some
means must be developed to filter the information.
Another problem is the way that weather is played. While
this is understandably an extremely difficult case, it is not
really played at all in the RSAS with regard to locating units,
conducting strikes, and carrying out operations at sea.
Still another problem is the conduct of ASW operations. The
RSAS treats ASW engagements as an expansion of a one-on-one
engagement between a Los Angeles SSN vs a C/V/D type. Even the
MPA, surface detection, and kill/counter-kill operations are
essentially derived from the basic index of a 688 vs a C/V/D. Not
only does this present some difficulties in extrapolating the
results for a number of surface ships, what happens when there
are literally dozens of submarines and/or surface ships in the
large sea areas? Fixed detection systems are played to a certain
extent, but these need to be refined into more precise capabili-
ties.
One of the basic problems regarding naval modeling in the
RSAS is the use of large sea areas. This is not a serious problem
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in certain restricted areas such as the Barents, or possibly tne
Norwegian Sea, but the entire northeast Atlantic being treated as
one sea area results in gross aggregations that are unrealistic
when one considers the action likely to take place there. Even
the Mediterranean, which is divided into three areas by the RSAS,
ignores the ASW problems presented by the several sea basins, and
would have been better divided at least into these basins . The
use of large sea areas means that space assets, long range recon-
naissance, and fixed surveillance systems cannot be simulated
very effectively. There are obviously limits to the amount of
locational detail that can be maintained without slowing the RSAS
down excessively. Some sort of grid system that would not require
precise locations, within some 100 NM or so, and would keep track





1. Introduction . The Tritten & Channell report on the RSAS at the
Naval Postgraduate School contains a summary of earlier versions
of the RSAS, and identifies shortfalls in the RSAS maritime
structure. Some of these shortfalls have been rectified, but for
others, the problem has been identified, and work is in progress
or in planning. As noted previously, the RSAS version considered
in this paper is release 3.0.
2. The RAND-ABEL Language . RAND-ABEL for those not familiar with
it, is a strongly typed procedural language that compiles into
"C", and runs on the UNIX operating system. The latest descrip-
tion is in the first revision to The RAND-ABEL Programming
Language Reference Manual by N. Z. Shapiro, et al, of the RAND
RSAS team. The language was developed by the RSAS analysts for
the RSAS when it was realized that there was not a language
suitable for RSAS use. Goals for the language included being
reasonably understandable by military and civilian defense
analysts and gamers who might not necessarily be programmers,
rapid in execution, and portable across a range of minicomputers
and powerful micro's. Lastly, the language had to support the
special reguirements of the RSAS, such as co-routines, tabular
data, and the creation of complex simulations by groups of
developers. RAND-ABEL is a derivative of, and a somewhat simpli-
fied version of ROSIE, and runs faster than that earlier
language. It should be noted, however, that RAND-ABEL is a pro-
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cedural language, and does not have an inference engine. It is
very suitable for representing knowledge in the form of "if-then-
else" statements, but it does not have the inferencing capabili-
ties of , e.g., LISP, PROLOG, or ROSIE. Since RAND-ABLE is a
strongly typed language, properties of identifiers can be tested
for statement validity, and many errors can be detected early.
Probably the most novel feature of the language is the table
statement, which can be used for both defining iterative pro-
cesses and creating decision tables. Functions or statements can
be called several times by each line of the table, and each
column can be matched with function parameters or statement
variables. The decision table uses conditions in the columns
followed by the action to be taken, and will stop the iteration
when the conditions are met. The primary advantage of the table
is that it is readily understandable by the strategic analysts
who should be the primary users of the language.
A sample RAND-ABEL table, this one for decisions is:
[comment: anything between the brackets is comment and will not
be executed.
]
Decision Table [Unique name for table]
input- input- / output- output-
variable-A variable-B / variable-x variable-y
========== ========== / ========== ==========.
value-A-1 value-B-1 value-X-1 value-Y-2
value-A-1 value-B-2 value-X-2 value-Y-3
value-A-2 value-B-1 value-X-3 value-Y-4
++ value-X-4 value-Y-5
[End Table].
The decision table reads "if input-variable-A is value-A-1
and input-variable-B is value-B-1 then output-variable-X is
value-X-1 and output-variable-Y is value-Y-2". The first row that
sets all variables true on the left of "/" sets the values to the
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right of "/", and the program exits from the table. "--" and "++"
are "don't cares", returning "true".
Another notable feature of the language is the "declaration
by example". All identifiers are declared by giving examples of
their use, usually by an assignment statement that declares a
variable, then gives the example. Thus, the identifier can be
declared without cluttering up the code with a data type - useful
when non-programmers are trying to read the code. The language
also has a built-in set of functions to handle coprocesses and a
data dictionary for ease in coordinating external data references
among the modules being developed by different teams of analysts.
This data dictionary describes the contents and attributes of the
data set to be used in common by all the RAND-ABEL modules, and
in the RSAS is known as the World Situation Data Set (WSDS). The
coprocess arrangement allows two or more processes to run in-
dependently and asynchronously, and will permit the creation of
an hierarchy, such as in a military command structure, as demon-
strated by the RSAS decision models. The language also permits
easy use of output to log files with simple statements regarding
"log" or "print".
Currently, the RAND-ABEL translator is used as an aid in
producing syntactically correct rules, and to produce compilable
"C" code for incorporation into the executable model. The RSAS
also has an interpreter feature. The analytic war plans can be
copied into the analyst's interpretive file, modified as desired,
run for debugging, and then run as part of the standard events.
The RSAS will run these special files instead of the comparable
baseline files.
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3. System Software . The RSAS system software is complex and
evolving. The best current description is contained in a discus-
sion paper prepared by Paul Davis and H. Edward Hall earlier this
year. Considerations for the system software design include:
Hierarchical agents or players as natural objects/modules; two
distinct types of decision modeling - National Command Levels
(NCL's) with strategic outlook, and Analytic War Plans (AWP's) as
building block scripts for operational commands; wakeup rules for
both scheduled and unscheduled action; lookaheads with imperfect
information; variable resolution time steps; flexibility; and
reproducible as well as understandable results. As noted above, a
combination of "C" and RAND-ABEL is used for speed on the one
hand, and understanding and analyst accessibility on the other.
The principle software entities include the Agents (Force, Red,
Blue, Green, Control), and the Data Bases (in "C" and ABEL).
Other entities run in the background, and include the system
monitor and the tools for analyst communication and analysis.
The control agent is key to the analytic efforts of using
the RSAS, and can be used in a number of different modes of
varying complexity. Probably the easiest mode is the scenario
generator with the user scheduling events using the menus from
the data editors, and the control agent passing instructions to
the other agents at the appropriate times. More complicated is
the actual writing of a control plan in RAND-ABEL similar to an
AWP, with its sleeps, moves, wakeups, etc.. This plan is usually
interpreted for speed and debugging, permitting the collection of
the desired events in one place. Somewhere in between is the
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"Order" mode, in which instructions are given to the "force
window" for immediate execution.
The various tools that can be called to assist the analyst
include the Interpreter for changing RAND-ABEL interactively, the
Data Editor for viewing and changing RAND-ABEL variables, the
Hierarchy Tool for monitoring and changing control flow, the
Cross-referencing Tool for finding definitions and ranges of
variables, the Logging Tool for providing variable resolution
reports, the Walking Menu Tool for viewing relevant parts of the
RAND-ABEL code, the "C" Menu Tool (CMENT) to interface into
Force-C (CAMPER), and the Graphics Tool for constructing and
displaying various types of charts and graphs.
Currently (Release 3.0), the RSAS has some 150,000 lines
each of ABEL and "C" code. The ABEL translates into about 450,000
lines of "C", for a total of around 600,000 lines of "C" code.
RSAS operates on C/UNIX systems running Berkeley 4.2 UNIX, and
reguires 12 MB main memory, 60 MB virtual memory, and total disk
size of 280 MB for storage.
There are, of course, problems in the RSAS software. There
are some communications problems between the "C" and ABEL prog-
rams that degrade performance and reguire the future development
of a "Force-server" approach, planned by RAND for RSAS 4.0. With
its extreme flexibility, the RSAS can be enervating, especially
to the beginner, because of the many options. Some narrower,
tailored modes need to be identified and established as options.
Most users will find that there are only certain sets of models
of real interest to them, and will probably prefer that the other
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sets run in background in some sort of default mode acceptable to
them. On the other hand, the monolithic Force-C program (CAMPER)
limits flexibility in complexity and resolution. Much of the
actual military modeling is executed in "C", reguiring expertise
in "C" (as well as the RSAS) to verify model details and/or to
change programs. Most users, however, will probably be satisfied
with a straightforward explanation of the algorithms, and the
option of using either default variable settings or entering
their own values. The RSAS is currently sadly lacking in such
algorithm explanations, and the M C" code has not been released.
The World Situation Data Set (WSDS) save and read procedures,
vital to analysis, appear fragile and need work to make them more
robust. Lastly, there are bugs in the models that will only
become apparent as they are used in analytic efforts.
4. ASW Models . The only naval model played in some detail in the
RSAS is the ASW one, and even that is very highly aggregated.
Details are contained in a draft presentation by Dr. John
Schrader of RAND concerning RSAS Naval Models, produced earlier
this year. As noted above, the basis for ASW is the 688 class vs
the C/V/Y/D. A baseline ASW factor is assigned to each ocean
region, subregion and chokepoint that represents the number of
days it would take a 688 to locate and destroy a C/V/Y/D in that
region. The reciprocal of this figure then becomes the baseline
daily kill rate, which can be changed by analysts if desired.
Each ship type capable of ASW operations is assigned effective-
ness and vulnerability parameters in terms of the reference
attacker (the 688). Each potential target is assigned vulner-
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ability and counterkill effectiveness in terms of the reference
target type (C/V/Y/D). ASW task groups have their relative capa-
bilities summed to determine attrition rates for each time
period. Similarly, counterkill effectiveness is pooled and attri-
tion distributed based upon individual relative vulnerabilities
when more than one target is present. Details of ASW status can
be called from the "Force Window" display menu using "asw-stat",
and the appropriate sea region or chokepoint.
ASW attrition methodology in its simplified form is to
determine initially the adjusted Blue kill rate and the Red
counterkill rate for each individual unit. Then each unit is
assigned a category, and two adjudications are made for each time
period (6 hours), one for blue and one for red. The total killer
ASW value is partitioned among the victims, the attrition rate is
calculated, assigned and totaled, and adjustments are made for
the time step of the adjudication period by the application of a
heuristic that tends to kill more vulnerable units and those with
more attrition and longer time in area first. Finally, the unit's
attrition is calculated :
unit share score
partition_attrition *
total share scores for partition
Also, if a unit's Ps drops below 0.2, it is further decremented
to 0.0, and adjudicated as sunk.
5. Sea Engagement Model . Attacks can be run using Blue carrier
battle group air assets against Red groups, and by using Red
shore or sea based air/missile assets. The best current descrip-
tion of these engagements is in the RSAS on-line documentation
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under Force-C/A/Doc/naval. Attacking forces are characterized as
a number of equivalent missiles, while defending forces are
equated to the number of long and short range AAW weapons avail-
able, together with a calculated saturation level. Defensive
weapons are aggregated for the force/group, and AAW capabilities
are not reduced until units are actually adjudicated as sunk. The
model has a limited capability to account for surveillance
onboard if air assets are present, offboard for queries to the
space model for support. Initially, the entry price is determined
using a table that takes into account factors such as the long
range AAW weapons, size of the attack, and a number of other
setable parameters. This entry price is subtracted from the
number of attacking weapons, and the remainder of the weapons are
engaged, up to the defender's saturation level. A fraction of the
attacking weapons is killed first by the long range AAW weapons,
then by the short range weapons, based upon setable parameters.
The survivors plus those weapons above the saturation level are
then distributed uniformly over the units of the attacked force/
group, and the hit capacity for each unit is reduced accordingly.
When hit capacity reaches 0, the ship is adjudicated as sunk. For
nuclear weapons, every hit sinks a ship, with the flagship the
last to be lost, although this may not be entirely realistic.
The entry price is calculated as follows:
ATTACK SIZE LONG-RANGE AAW











If the attacking force is made up of aircraft, the model
determines the number of aircraft kills made prior to weapons
release. This is a function of the surveillance level for both
sides, and is determined by a matrix which gives maximum aircraft
kills when the defender has the surveillance advantage, and
minimum kills when the attacker has the surveillance advantage.




0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
1 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0
2 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.2
3 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.5
Surveillance: = none, 1 = onboard only, 2 = offboard only,
3 = both.
Most of the parameters in the naval models can be changed by
entering various tables in CAMPER or the file vessel. sec, not a
trivial task. Examples include: "vessel" parameter table, "class"
parameter table, and the "sea" parameter table. Damage levels on
ships that have not been sunk can be changed, the hit capacity of
ships can be changed, entry price and saturation level can be
changed for force/groups. Naval forces can be displayed in sever-
al differing ways from the force window: by nation, force/group,
by region, by offensive and defensive assets, and by rules of
engagement for each side.
There are, of course, several problems with regard to the
sea engagements. (These were discussed in some detail by Dr.
Bruce Bennett of RAND in a paper presented earlier this year.)
Ship/ submarine performance is not degraded until it is sunk
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there currently is no graceful derogation of capability until the
unit is lost, and this is not very realistic. There should be as
a minimum a linear degradation, and in some cases a geometric or
other degradation factor. Also, attacks against one group are not
distributed against other groups even though they might be op-
erating together. A simple command and control fix should be
feasible here to spread the damage around.
Attacking missiles are spread evenly over all the units in
the attacked force/group, rather ignoring targeting information,
EW on both sides, cover and deception, etc.. A simple methodology
taking into account these factors, and using a matrix and calcu-
lation to determine if the attacking weapons would "bunch" on the
key targets would seem appropriate. In addition, a factor needs
to be entered to take into account the differing capabilities of
various weapons - not now considered by the model.
For AAW, short range weapons cover the whole force/group and
do not have their own saturation threshold. A change is needed to
reflect that short range weapons protect own unit only, and that
they have their own saturation level.
6. Naval Command and Control . Naval action can be started cur-
rently by including such action as part of an Analytic War Plan
(AWP), by issuing Force orders via the Force Window, or, in some
cases, by changing the ROE's. (Combat will not occur, e.g., if
both forces are in a "defend" status.) Naval war plans need to be
developed and either incorporated into an AWP, made part of the
default naval models with parameters that can be modified, or
made interactive in the case of major naval decisions (initial
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engagements, nuclear use, etc.). RAND has proposed five naval
postures, an encounter matrix, some search algorithms, and some
trail routines. Once the opposing groups have a "find", and the
ROE's are appropriate, then an engagement will be likely. Key
factors will be which side is the finder, and the maximum weapons
range. Previously, orders were reguired for an attack to be
conducted, but it would seem that such an attack should be start-
ed, pursued, and broken off based upon some heuristics such as
initial salvo size, weapons range, acceptable loss limits, and
key weapons load-out.
RAND has also proposed the "naval commander" model which
will receive contact reports, review assets, decide when to
launch a strike, set a wake-up, and then issue appropriate orders
at that time.
RAND has also proposed to use a regional radius concept to
determine which units can participate in an attack. This, of
course, reguires making some aggregation assumptions about
regions, steaming times, flight times, etc., but appears useful
as a first cut attempt. It is better than the current "everyone
is in the regional centroid" concept.
7. Additional Requirements . The Tritten & Channell Technical
Report on the RSAS at the Naval Postgraduate School identified
the improvements needed to meet NPS and Navy requirements, and
this remains the best overall statement of Navy needs. Much has
been accomplished in the past year, much remains to be done. The
important naval requirements in addition to those in the Tritten
& Channell report are:
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The major contribution to both sides from locational systems
that are not integral to the afloat forces needs to be refined
and improved. While there are classification problems in this
regard, some means of aggregation should be established.
Convoy operations, including losses from mines, submarines,
air attack, and the resulting derogation of throughput need to be
addressed for a realistic long term war, and as part of the
overall sealift and logistics flow.
Improvements in mine warfare and amphibious warfare are
needed, as these are currently played in only a very limited
form.
The area and command names need to be checked and changed to
reflect current customary usage on the part of military officers.
A continuing effort will be required to maintain databases,
perhaps one of the most difficult problems of all. While updates
have been made in certain areas, the current default database is
1985, which is rapidly becoming dated. Without a good, reason-
ably current database, analysts and other users of the RSAS will
loose faith in the system and turn to other programs.





1. Improvement s . The RSAS is a growing and evolving system that
will assist analysts and instructors in conducting strategic
assessments and analyses. The models in the system that address
the air-land war on the central front, most of the strategic
models, and parts of the S-Land models are better developed than
those that deal with naval warfare, logistics, command and
control, and intelligence. RAND has recognized most of the
problem areas, and has plans to improve them.
2. Advantages . The Red side is, or certainly can be, played in
accordance with perceived Red strategy. The asymmetries that
exist in Red and Blue naval thinking, employment of forces,
readiness, and training can be represented readily in the RSAS.
Perhaps best of all, a range of options for both sides can be
developed and studied in the RSAS in reasonable amounts of time,
and at reasonable costs.
3. ASW Detection . The ASW model does not treat adequately the
detection capabilities (or lack thereof) for the various ocean
areas. This can probably best be done by assigning a detection
factor for each area based upon experienced judgment regarding
fixed and/or other non-integral system capabilities for the area.
It should be recalled that individual units have little likeli-
hood of detection success if not assisted by some of the more
broad area search assets.
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4. ASW Ocean Areas . The ASW model needs to take into account the
sea basin problem for selected sea regions, where search and
detection capabilities differ according to season, weather, ship-
ping traffic, etc.. The Mediterranean and the North Atlantic/
Norwegian Sea areas could be used as pilot models for develop-
ment. Other areas outside the primary operating/engagement areas
could probably be aggregated at this stage in RSAS development.
5. Battle Group Operations . Individual ships, as such, are not as
important following their assignment to battle groups. It might
be easier and reguire less system resource time if the emphasis
were on aggregate battle groups rather than on individual ships.
Submarines, due to the nature of their operations, probably
should still be modeled as individual units. Something is lacking
also in eguating MPA to SSN's.
6. Air Wing Strikes . The generation of carrier air wing strikes
is too complex. There should be a default mode which considers
the nature of the attacked force/group, and which simulates
standard air wing tactics to conduct the strike. This type of
simulation should be adeguate for the level of the RSAS.
7. Ship Locations . Something needs to be done about the lo-
cational data on naval units. The system does not actually know
where ships are located beyond the centroid of the sea region,
unless the unit is in a well defined chokepoint. This may be
adeguate for small ocean areas, but larger ones such as the
eastern Atlantic need refinement. Perhaps a compromise solution
such as using lat/long for high intensity areas such as the
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western Pacific, the north Atlantic, and the Mediterranean would
be appropriate.
8. Intelligence . With regard to detection and location problems,
the RSAS models make some allowances; however, the factors are
rough, and do not permit playing effectively an important aspect
of naval warfare. Ground truth, or perfect intelligence, is
basically given to both sides. Work is in progress, at least with
the naval models, regarding the availability of information on
the opposing forces. This is a complex problem that needs more
work - some means must be developed to filter the information.
9. Convoy Operations . Convoy operations need to be modeled in
some detail, to include losses from mines, air and submarine
attacks. The resulting derogation in the throughput of personnel
and material should be considered as part of the resupply of the
air-land battle ashore.
10. Amphibious Warfare . Amphibious warfare needs to be played
from a true amphibious point of view, rather than as a simple
reinforcement unit to the land battle. Amphibious ships are not
in the current naval model and need to be added, in aggregate as
a minimum, in terms of an amphibious force/group. A grouping of
amphibious shipping and embarked Marine forces with mobility,
defense, and damage factors should be sufficient.
11. Mine Warfare . The mining capability needs to be improved. The
current model of mining and clearing without regard to assets
should be addressed.
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12. Analyst Use . The RSAS is far too complex for most users, who
will probably be interested in the details of only certain
portions of the entire system, and would prefer that the other
parts run in an acceptable default mode. Efforts should be made
to apply reasonable defaults to all variables, to expand the
explanations for key algorithms, and to develop additional de-
fault scenarios.
13. Database Upkeep . Database upkeep is an important issue.
Information must be kept up-to-date or users will loose confi-
dence in the output, and will discard the RSAS as a valuable
tool. In addition the database entries, for the naval portion at
least, must be derived from the best all-source information
available on the Red side, and the most reliable data available
on the Blue and Green sides. Data base responsibilities must be
clearly delineated.
14. RSAS Strengths . On balance, however, the RSAS does very well
at moving large numbers of units around and conducting engagement
assessments for multiple battles. Many of the deficiencies in the
naval models have been overcome, and most of those remaining are
being addressed. Even now we have a system that can model Red and
Blue land, sea, and air forces on a global scale, using a rela-
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